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In 1993, Anne Hunsaker Hawkins published Reconstructing Illness, a study of 
memoirs about the experience of disease, dysfunction or death for which she 
coined a new term: pathography. In a move familiar from the brief flowering 
of the ‘personal criticism’ movement in the late 1980s, Hawkins confessed 
that her academic interest had been motivated by her own father’s death: the 
critical work thus shared the very impulse it sought to analyse. In Reconstructing 
Illness, Hawkins noted a striking fact: before 1950, she had discovered only 
a handful of published pathographies. After 1950, the genre had haltingly 
emerged but then accelerated, particularly in the 1980s, with hundreds of 
texts published. But even more strikingly, the number of pathographies 
doubled again in just the six years between 1993 and 1999, when the second 
edition of Hawkins’ book appeared.1 
 This spike in production placed pathography at the heart of the 
contemporary boom in the trauma memoir. In the 1990s, life writing was 
partially re-oriented to pivot around the intrusive traumatic event that, at 
a stroke, shattered narrative coherence. The sociologist Arthur Frank saw 
illness as ‘narrative wreckage’ and pathography as a literal narrative salve: 
‘Stories have to repair the damage that illness has done’.2 This formulation 
owed much to the philosopher Paul Ricoeur, who regarded narrative as an 
act of con-figuration which ‘“grasps together” and integrates into one whole 
and complete story multiple and scattered events’.3 Trauma is a dis-figuration 
of that narrative possibility, but what the narrative memoir promises is a 
redemptive account of how the post-traumatic self might be re-configured 
around its woundedness.
 The trauma memoir is one of the cultural symptoms that follows from 
the securing of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a recognised psychiatric 
illness in official diagnostics in 1980, after a long campaign of psychiatric 
advocacy in the 1970s by a coalition of activists. It has been my contention 
that many forms of culture have played a significant role in articulating 
how PTSD seems to affect the narrative possibilities of selfhood after 1980.4 
The memoir boom is now a vast and complicated delta region with major 
channels but also curious back-waters, and is treacherous to map. However, it 
is important to distinguish the tributaries rather than subsume everything into 
an undifferentiated trauma discourse. For the record, we might distinguish 
five elements that converge to produce the memoir boom since the 1990s: 
1) the feminist revaluation of the autobiographical utterance, at the level of 
therapeutic practice, life writing, and in critical theory; 2) a politicisation of 
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the illness memoir by people with AIDS, producing a large body of testimony 
designed both to commemorate the dead and to denounce medical or 
governmental ignorance; 3) an expanding terrain of pathographies that 
began with cancer memoirs but soon moved into subsets including depression, 
exotic or bizarre disorders and parental illness or death; 4) the related rise of 
thanatography, or death writing, which might include memoirs by carers for 
the terminally ill, suicide in the family, or accounts of the mourning process; 
and 5) the re-programming of the celebrity exposé to be organised around 
the revelation of the traumatic secret (a boom begun in England with the 
phenomenal success of the autobiography of the glamour model, Katie Price, 
Being Jordan). These elements run the gamut from honourable and political 
interventions to the plain tiresome and narcissistic. But they are also only 
the most immediate determinants of the boom. Many of the questions of 
the ethics and aesthetics of narrating extreme and deathly experience have 
been determined by Holocaust testimony. This has held centre place in many 
cultural theories of the representation of trauma that emerged in the early 
1990s. 
 In sum, we might regard the trauma memoir as the exemplary form 
of what Ross Chambers has termed ‘aftermath cultures,’ defined by a 
testimonial impulse that is nevertheless marked by ‘a strange nexus of denial 
and acknowledgement’.5 These memoirs at once allure with the promise of 
transgressive experiences but are abjected for precisely those revelations 
in an irresolvable tension of attraction and repulsion that accounts for the 
compulsion to publish so many similar confessions. In the midst of this torrent 
of memoirs came Joan Didion’s The Year of Magical Thinking.
 Didion’s memoir about the death of her husband, John Gregory Dunne, 
assumed an impressive gravitas given Didion’s status as one of the pre-
eminent practitioners of the literary journalism that took the personal turn 
with Tom Wolfe, Hunter S. Thompson and others in the 1960s. At a time 
when disdain for the ‘misery memoir’ was regularly voiced in the so-called 
quality press, Didion’s signature prose style promised icy control and all 
the literary virtues.6 Within months, David Hare observed, the memoir had 
become ‘the one indispensable handbook to bereavement’.7 Critics had 
already spoken of Didion’s earlier accounts of the 1960s as using ‘her private 
and often anguished experience as a metaphor for the writer, her generation, 
and sometimes her entire society’.8 Startlingly, The White Album began with 
a transcript of her psychiatric report from her outpatient assessment, tartly 
observing ‘an attack of vertigo and nausea does not now seem to me an 
inappropriate response to the summer of 1968’.9 It was unsurprising, then, 
that her contribution to contemporary trauma culture was a massive best-seller 
in America, filling the display windows of every bookshop in New York in 
the winter of 2005. It was also peculiarly horrible to read, because the reader 
knew more than the author. John Gregory Dunne died five days after his only 
daughter with Didion, Quintana, had been admitted to intensive care with 
pneumonia and septic shock. The stress of this event likely contributed to his 
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fatal heart-attack, re-constructed in obsessive detail in the opening pages of 
the memoir. The year of magical thinking follows not only the secret rituals 
of mourning her husband, but also Didion’s anxious hovering at the bedside 
of her daughter through her severe illness. Because Quintana is in a coma 
and only fitfully awake, Didion has to break repeatedly the news of the death 
of her father, because the daughter keeps forgetting. The book ends with 
Quintana out of her emergency and Didion cautiously seeing the potential to 
re-figure her life after her husband’s death. But the reader knows that after 
the completion of the book Quintana also died, aged 39. This already fragile 
narrative is therefore over-shadowed for the reader by the fore-knowledge 
of this second loss. Within weeks of Quintana’s death, Didion returned to 
the material, but this time seeking a form that she had never used before, 
the better to express devastating loss. The dramatic monologue of The Year 
of Magical Thinking, in which a version of Didion was played by her friend 
Vanessa Redgrave, premiered in New York in March 2007 and repeated a 
sell-out run in London in summer 2008 at the National Theatre. The play 
rebalances the emphasis from the husband to the daughter: it was composed, 
Didion said, to ‘tell me what I did not know when I wrote the book’.10
 This essay is an attempt to reflect on why this memoir, amidst the 
hundreds of others in the current pathographic wave, became such a cultural 
event. James Womack, in a review that wanted very much to be iconoclastic, 
concluded that: ‘The eagerness with which people have embraced The Year 
of Magical Thinking suggests that we are easily flattered … The heroic scale 
of this grief is inclusive, it tells us what we might be capable of … It confirms 
our human amplitude’.11 There is something that he has discerned about 
trauma narratives and their magical contagion, but the reasons for Didion’s 
cultural prominence are more complex and overdetermined than this.
 At the core of the memoir is the attempt to convey the cognitive processes 
of grief, the secret behaviours of magical thinking in the traumatic aftermath. 
‘I knew that John was dead,’ she reports. ‘Yet I was myself in no way prepared 
to accept this news as final: there was a level on which I believed that what 
had happened remained reversible … I needed to be alone so that he could 
come back. This was the beginning of my year of magical thinking’.12 The 
autopsy will isolate the problem and thus cure him of death; she keeps his 
clothes and shoes for his return home; she avoids reading his obituaries; she 
develops circuitous routes in New York and Los Angeles to avoid associative 
memories to their married life; when she sees his face in a montage of the 
deceased at the Oscars (they collaborated on Hollywood scripts), she chides 
herself that ‘I had allowed other people to think he was dead. I had allowed 
him to be buried alive’ (YMT, p35). Repetitive syntactical structures convey 
both a sense of magical incantation to keep him alive, but also a kind of post-
traumatic automatism - and these repetitions are accumulated throughout 
the book to brilliant effect. These tropes are at the foundation of literature’s 
elegiac function, at least according to William Watkin, who suggests that in 
elegy ‘language’s assumed magical powers of naming, and thus of giving 
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or extending life, is called upon in the service of intense grief ’.13 Didion 
develops, elaborates, and rhetorically conjures up the superstitions and rituals 
that she comes to regard, retrospectively, as a deranged form of this magical 
naming. 
 It is tempting to reach for Sigmund Freud’s essay ‘Mourning and 
Melancholia’ to explore this suspensive psychological state. The griever 
struggles and resists the reality-testing that keeps confirming the loss in 
order that ‘the existence of the lost object is psychically prolonged’.14 In 
melancholia, the pathological intensification of mourning, reality-testing is 
completely abandoned for a full-scale incorporation of the lost other, keeping 
the dead alive in the psyche. Psychic defences produce an uncanny creature, 
hovering between life and death. It is at this border that Freud argues the 
uncanny produces unnerving regressions back to beliefs we thought that 
enlightened, sceptical civilisation had surmounted. ‘All supposedly educated 
people,’ Freud commented, ‘have ceased to believe that the dead can become 
visible as spirits.’ Yet, he pointed out, ‘almost all of us think as savages do on 
this topic’: the dead remain behind in some form or other.15 These Gothic-
tinged formulations were fully elaborated for a theory of haunting as a result 
of melancholic incorporation by Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok.16 From 
here, it is a short step to animism or magical thinking, for Freud the most 
primitive belief system, first developed, as he puts it in Totem and Taboo, to 
address the problem of death and ‘the emotional conflict into which survivors 
are plunged’.17 Magical thinking, the omnipotent power of thought to 
reanimate the living, possesses the logic of renunciation, a refusal to accept 
the pain of separation. Following this trajectory thus brings us to an account 
of grief which can become thoroughly magical.
 Aside from the difficulty of Freud’s classically Victorian evolutionary 
alignment of what he calls the ‘folly’ of magical thinking with childhood 
wish-fulfilment and primitive omnipotent thoughts, Freud also moves rapidly 
beyond normal processes of grief, about which he has little to say (‘it never 
occurs to us,’ he says, ‘to regard it as a pathological condition’) and towards 
the extreme states of melancholia.18 What is affecting about Didion’s portrait 
of grief is the everydayness of her small acts of magical thinking, their 
fleetingness and interstitiality, the way that they can co-exist with perfectly 
rational and ordered social behaviours. In this sense, her memoir chimes more 
with John Bowlby’s attempt to provide an account of the normal mourning 
process that he contended Freud had overlooked. Bowlby identified three 
phases of mourning. The first is the overwhelming urge to recover the lost 
object, a distending grief that is then followed by the disorganisations of 
mourning proper and the eventual reorganisation of the survivor’s sense of 
self that incorporates the loss into a re-configured life narrative. The Year of 
Magical Thinking dramatizes the first phase of the urge to recover the lost 
object. ‘So long as the response systems are focused on the lost object there are 
strenuous and often angry efforts to recover it,’ Bowlby says, ‘and these efforts 
may continue despite their fruitlessness being painfully evident to others, 
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and sometimes also to the bereaved’.19 ‘Many sufferers from pathological 
mourning,’ Bowlby continues, ‘have become fixated in the first phase of the 
mourning process and, without knowing it, are striving to recover the object’.20 
The language of the magical recurs in Bowlby’s account too. In speaking of 
the exorbitant anger that can be directed at doctors or comforters or the 
lost object, Bowlby discerns ‘a secret hope that perhaps in some miraculous 
way [wishes] to seek out the villain that will lead to the recovery of the loss’.21 
Didion’s focus on this phase, berating doctors and the bureaucrats of death, 
with only a very sketchy outline of her reorganisation a year on from her 
husband’s death in the last few pages of the memoir, suggests she is interested 
more in communicating the secret life of this first phase of mourning. The 
fore-knowledge of her daughter’s death adds to the fragility of her tentative 
re-organisation.
 This convergence of theory and memoir is perhaps so well-oiled because 
Didion obsessively reads the literature of mourning, unable to switch off her 
journalistic impulse to accrue information. Yet the instant one repeats this 
research gesture, it reveals that the current psychological research on grief, 
trauma and magical thinking has largely peeled away from the psychoanalytic 
framework for more cognitive and information-processing models (in keeping 
with much of the discipline). Magical thinking is in fact an incredibly hot topic 
in empirical psychological research. One area is clustered around testing the 
limits of culturally specific forms of magical thinking. This work retains much 
of the intellectual framework set up by J.G. Frazer’s The Golden Bough (1890), 
in which sympathetic magic works through the laws of similarity and contiguity 
(‘things which have been in contact with each other continue to act on each 
other at a distance after the physical contact has been severed’).22 Beliefs about 
who can and cannot catch AIDS and from what objects, for instance, differ 
around the world but consistently privilege magical and moral pollutions over 
the facts of viral transmission.23 Another area of research focuses on magical 
thinking in children, now working to correct Jean Piaget’s influential view 
set out in The Child’s Conception of the World in 1929 that magical thinking 
is a universal and irrational set of beliefs retained up to the age of nine or 
ten. Children’s belief in wish-fulfilment has been systematically tested (a 
Magical Ideation Scale for measurement has been developed), and is now 
seen in sophisticated inter-relation with the very early acquisition of rational 
and causative modes of thought.24 Research has also targeted how stressful 
situations reduce the ability to control cognitive operations and thus amplify 
magical thinking, a process in which ‘individuals may generate solutions 
that increase their control over the sources of stress’.25 This stance leads into 
research that has examined bereavement. Martin Lunghi speculates that 
beliefs in continuity are biologically hard-wired, so that the discontinuity of 
death prompts all kinds of magical evasion and beliefs in forms of posthumous 
survival. It is only recently that Western cultures have begun to consider 
beliefs in continuity after death as ‘disturbingly deviant’ and that the ‘magical 
thinking of the bereaved requires to be “cured”’.26
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 This kind of research offers one clue to Didion’s success. Modernity has 
defined its rationality through the suppression of magical thought. This 
is what Weberian rationality means: ‘the world is disenchanted. One need 
no longer have recourse to magical means’.27 Belief in magical agencies 
becomes aligned to the primitive and the child. Edward Tylor, one of the first 
professional anthropologists in England, argued in 1871 that the function of 
anthropology was to seek out and eliminate ‘survivals’ of primitive thought, 
the ‘pernicious delusions’ such as magic that could only be associated with ‘the 
lowest known stages of civilisation’.28 Frazer’s study of magic was conceived 
within the same evolutionary framework. Magic was the most primitive set 
of human beliefs, ‘a spurious system of natural law’ that hadn’t yet advanced 
to the more conceptually sophisticated delusion of religious belief, which was 
in turn finally overthrown by a rational understanding of causation.29 Freud 
propped himself on Tylor and Frazer’s model for his discussion of animism, 
magic and the omnipotence of thought in Totem and Taboo. Ascribing this 
management of death to a logic of instinctual renunciation, Freud even 
apologised for ‘endowing modern savages with a subtlety in their mental 
activities which exceeds all probability’.30
 Every one of these theorists, however, was perplexed by the brute persistence 
of magical thinking into the heart of modernity. Tylor dismissed the late 
Victorian revival in occult sciences and spiritualism as perfect illustrations 
of savage survivals, yet could not stem their popularity. Frazer conceded that 
despite his linear developmental theory, magical beliefs continued ‘among 
the dull, the weak, the ignorant, and the superstitious, who constitute, 
unfortunately, the vast majority of mankind’. European civilisation, he 
feared, stood ‘on a thin crust which may at any moment be rent by the 
subterranean forces below,’ the magic flowing back into an only recently 
inoculated scientific world.31 Freud, meanwhile, adopted the public persona 
of a secular rationalist, but privately upheld all manner of superstitious and 
magical thoughts, ranging from numerology to telepathy, meaning that core 
psychoanalytic concepts like transference have been consistently theorised as 
occult transmissions.32
 This has prompted a rethinking of the relation between modernity and 
its (magical) others, which suggests less stark opposition than complex inter-
dependence. After all, as John Jervis suggests, the supernatural ‘is a product 
of modernity, since it only makes sense by contrast with the category of the 
“natural”, the notion of nature as secular, law-governed, available for scientific 
investigation’.33 Simon During has examined the rise of ‘secular magic’ in 
modernity, the imperfect stamping out of superstition creating instead ‘a fuzzy 
and variegated vernacular modern magic’ that is a strange mix of superstition, 
religious sentiment and a knowing suspension of disbelief.34 Charles Taylor’s 
reflections on the persistence of religious thought into Western modernity 
follows a similar path. He suggests everyone in the West ‘as we grow up 
has had to take on the disciplines of disenchantment, and we regularly 
reproach each other for our failings in this regard, and accuse each other of 
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“magical thinking”, of indulging in “myth”, of giving way to “fantasy”’.35 Yet 
the vast work of his Secular Age is devoted to rethinking secularity so as to 
understand the persistence of the magical and numinous, despite the story 
of disenchantment we have told ourselves. This simultaneity is supported by 
current psychological theory, too. Nemeroff and Rozin conclude that ‘Magical 
thinking has stubbornly resisted the aggressive expansion of modern science 
… and, if anything, appears to be making a major resurgence in terms of 
explicit and culturally (or at least, subculturally) supported beliefs’.36 
 Didion’s memoir therefore speaks to a secret history of cognitions that 
have persisted yet been rendered shameful by modernity. It is no coincidence, 
I think, that the success of her book shares the same cultural moment as 
a renewed attempt to reinforce a violent opposition between science and 
religion, as ideologues of scientific materialism like Richard Dawkins bemoan 
the increase in superstition and pointlessly wrestle with their symbiotic other, 
fundamentalism.37
 But if Didion confesses to a mode of magical thought that is pervasive 
then why do we need to read a trauma memoir to be told the secret of grief ’s 
magic tricks? There are standard answers for this. Philip Ariès addressed the 
progressive occlusion of the encounter with death in the West, including a 
‘brutal revolution’ after 1945, where the culture of death ceases to be a ‘ritual 
ceremony’ and becomes instead ‘a technical phenomenon’: ‘mourning is no 
longer a necessary period imposed by society, it has become a morbid state 
which must be treated, shortened, erased by the “doctor of grief ”’,38 Anthony 
Giddens has argued in an allied way that late modernity is characterised 
by the ‘sequestration of experience’ in which encounters with extreme 
experiences such as birth or death are placed under institutional command, 
a protective cocoon that has its evident benefits but is also fragile and liable 
to crack if routine experience is disturbed. As Giddens explains, the modern 
individual ‘is likely to lack the psychic and social resources to cope with the 
issues thus posed’.39 In this situation, every departure from the norm becomes 
catastrophic and a death cataclysmic. In Charles Taylor’s terms, the modern 
self is ‘buffered’, yet traumatic events puncture that protective sphere and 
return us instantly to the pre-modern self which is ‘porous’, and thus open to 
all kinds of belief in occult transmissions and sympathetic magic. Discussions 
of pathography typically account for the rise of the genre as a counter-reaction 
to the birth of the clinic - of technological medicine and the patient as a dis-
articulated vector of disease. For Anne Hunsaker Hawkins or Arthur Frank, 
the memoir returns a fragile holistic voice of the ill or bereaved person against 
the indifferent machineries of health. Because, it seems, we are able to have 
less and less experience of illness and death, the trauma memoir provides 
scripts for individual agency as much as narrative restoration.
 Yet there is magic being worked at a different and perhaps more literal 
level. From the origins of dynamic psychology with Mesmerism in the late 
eighteenth century, many have regarded traumatic experience as a route to 
enhanced psychical - perhaps even supernatural - powers. The psychically 
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damaged gained remarkably heightened perception in the mesmeric rapport, 
and this has been consistently reported from Mesmer’s practice in the 1780s 
through the experience of John Elliotson in London in the 1830s to the 
work of Jean-Martin Charcot and Pierre Janet who hypnotised hysterics 
in Paris in the 1880s.40  The psychoanalyst Sandor Ferenczi believed the 
same thing. ‘In the moment of trauma,’ Ferenczi said in the early 1930s, 
‘some sort of omniscience about the world … makes the person … more or 
less clairvoyant’.41 He found it difficult treating his traumatised patients, 
ones touched by this little death, because he believed that their uncanny 
clairvoyance gave them the ability to read his mind, most particularly when he 
was failing to pay proper attention to them. These odd beliefs continue into 
those psychologists centrally involved in establishing Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder as a diagnostic category in 1980. Robert Jay Lifton was the central 
advocate who argued that Hiroshima survivors, Vietnam veterans, disaster 
victims and survivors of what was then called Rape Trauma Syndrome shared 
enough symptom clusters to deserve the generic description that became 
PTSD. Lifton, at his most passionate, argued that trauma survivors served 
a prophetic function for a century that had ‘imposed upon us all a series of 
immersions into death’.42 In 1973, he argued that ‘the antiwar veterans take 
their place among a special contemporary group of “prophetic survivors”’. 
Their cultural centrality derived, he claimed, ‘from the holocausts they have 
survived’.43 The Vietnam veteran thus became a kind of shaman or seer, 
because, Lifton said, they had ‘crossed over to the other side and returned’.44 
These were the agents who could shake America from the generalised post-
traumatic numbing that had allowed the war to continue. The sense that 
trauma gives enhanced psychical powers recurred in the ‘recovered memory’ 
movement in the 1980s and 1990s, too. In Judith Herman’s incredibly 
influential book on sexual abuse, Trauma and Recovery, it is suggested 
that the pathological environment of abuse ‘fosters the development of 
abnormal states of consciousness in which the ordinary relations of body 
and mind, reality and imagination, knowledge and memory, no longer hold. 
The language of the supernatural, banished for three hundred years from 
scientific discourse, still intrudes into the most sober attempts to describe the 
psychological manifestations of chronic childhood trauma’.45 Intense stress 
and trauma, as we have seen, allegedly amplifies magical thinking.
 On the one hand, a trauma memoir like The Year of Magical Thinking is 
extraordinary because of its very ordinariness: it tells us that we have become 
so sequestered from death that we need a literature to script our mourning 
behaviours. But on the other hand, it speaks volumes about the glamour 
that has accrued to suffering extreme and unusual experience far beyond 
the norm, the fascination in removing the veil from unbearable private 
experience that motors the memoir boom. ‘Glamour’ and ‘fascination’ retain, 
just about, their original magical meanings: we might say that the trauma 
subject casts a spell and generates a proliferating readership through a kind 
of empathetic or magical contagion. The idea of occult transmissibility or 
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contagion is at the heart of magical thinking: it is defined in one study as a 
belief that the ‘transfer of energy or information between physical systems 
may take place solely because of their similarity or contiguity in space and 
time’.46 But transmissibility is also at the heart of trauma theory: it is a field 
that constantly worries about the dangers of traumatic affect ‘to confuse self 
and other, and collapse all distinctions’ as it moves from primary to secondary 
victims, or induces what has been termed vicarious traumatisation.47 In one of 
the foundational texts of cultural trauma theory, Shoshana Felman and Dori 
Laub’s Testimony, there is a passionate advocacy that the affective contagions 
of trauma should be positively encouraged in the classroom as an educational 
tool. This problematic traumatic pedagogy is premised on the magical law 
of contiguity: to read traumatic affect is to imbibe its mana and be compelled 
to pass it on in some form of witness.48
 Thus far these reflections have rather remorselessly contextualised 
Didion’s memoir in highly abstract frames of reference - the kind of 
intellectual abstractions Didion herself claims she eschews for the specific, the 
tangible and the concrete.49 But if we re-situate The Year of Magical Thinking 
back in Didion’s oeuvre there is one final ironic observation to make. Didion’s 
fame as a journalist resides in her searing critiques of America in the 1960s, 
portrayed in the essays in Slouching Towards Bethlehem and The White Album 
(and figured fictionally in her novel of breakdown, Play it as it Lays). The 
Sixties are portrayed as profoundly ruptural and melancholic, an era that 
breaks catastrophically away from the certainties and entitlements of prior 
generations. At the famous opening of The White Album, Didion proclaims 
that ‘We tell ourselves stories in order to live … We live, especially if we are 
writers, by the imposition of a narrative line upon disparate images, by the 
“ideas” with which we have learned to freeze the shifting phantasmagoria 
which is our actual experience’.50 The Sixties, she continues, was ‘a time when 
I began to doubt the premises of all the stories I had ever told myself … I was 
supposed to have a script, and had mislaid it. I was supposed to hear cues, and 
no longer did. I was meant to know the plot, but all I knew was what I saw’.51 
Didion conveys what she terms the ‘authentically senseless’ nature of the 1960s 
by reaching for emblematic instances where meaning simply collapses: the 
Manson murders, the banality of Jim Morrison’s sex and death persona, the 
hippies of Haight-Ashbury. Each becomes an ‘uninterpreted image … evoking 
a chaos indecipherable’.52 Indeed, one might argue that much of Didion’s 
writing relies on her repeated failures to perform the role of the investigative 
journalist, as the pieces of the investigation fail to come together and make 
sense. From Salvador to the California of her previous memoir, Where I Was 
From, Didion stages the limits of meaningful interpretation. This is the core of 
what Ellen Friedman calls the ‘Didion sensibility’ - an existentially meaningless, 
‘melancholy and deprived world’.53 In this sense, her journalism is all trauma 
memoir, since trauma is now conventionally represented as the disfiguration 
of meaningful sequence, the rock that produces narrative shipwreck. The Year 
of Magical Thinking would then appear to be merely the latest in this sequence 
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of memoirs and reports in this mode, since it deals with grief as ‘the void, the 
very opposite of meaning, the relentless succession of moments during which 
we will confront the experience of meaninglessness itself ’ (YTM, p189). In a 
way it offers a curious kind of solace in this sequence, because it finally fills 
the Didionesque void with a specific content of meaninglessness: the brute 
and boring experience of mourning.
 Yet despite the continuity of that empty iterative style, there is a difference. 
Didion gained leverage on the Sixties generation because she was not of it. 
When she says at the end of The White Album that ‘I am talking here about 
being the child of my time,’ she locates herself very specifically in the 1950s 
generation.54 Her privileged Sacramento family upbringing and the solidity of 
her Fifties education gives her, she argues, the individualistic moral stance to 
critique conservatively what she regards as the senselessness of the collective 
Sixties revolution. Her stance is to be disjunct with the times in these earlier 
works, refusing identity by declaring that she is not the society in microcosm 
in The White Album. In contrast, The Year of Magical Thinking suggests that she 
has coincided with the times at just the moment she appears most asocial 
and secretive in the senselessness of her grief. What is the most private and 
atomised experience has become the most representative and public in a 
traumatophilic era. Now that, as Paul Daniels might say, is magic.
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